The role of optimal threats in auction design
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Cites work
- Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Haggling over substitutes
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Optimal Auction Design
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
Cited in
(12)- Partial ownership and cross-border mergers
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs
- Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405868 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal sales mechanism with outside options
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908118 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal student allocation with peer effects
- Mechanism and network design with private negative externalities
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
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