The role of optimal threats in auction design

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.11.006MaRDI QIDQ1007337zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicolás Figueroa, Vasiliki Skreta

Publication date 20 March 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiesoptimal auctionstype-dependent outside options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
• Optimal sales mechanism with outside options
• Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities

Cites work

• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Haggling over substitutes
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Optimal Auction Design
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models

Cited in

(14)

• Optimal sales mechanism with outside options
• Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs
• Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908118 (Why is no real title available?)
• Partial ownership and cross-border mergers
• Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
• Mechanism and network design with private negative externalities
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405868 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
• Optimal student allocation with peer effects
• Ideal default for resolving disputes efficiently
• Optimal selling mechanisms with endogenous seller outside offers

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