The role of optimal threats in auction design
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1007337
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.11.006zbMATH Open1158.91360OpenAlexW2037016669MaRDI QIDQ1007337FDOQ1007337
Nicolás Figueroa, Vasiliki Skreta
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.006
Cites Work
- Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
- Haggling over substitutes
- Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Optimal Auction Design
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
Cited In (11)
- Partial ownership and cross-border mergers
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities
- Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs
- Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal student allocation with peer effects
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
This page was built for publication: The role of optimal threats in auction design
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1007337)
