Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
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Publication:1408641
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00021-6zbMATH Open1066.91033MaRDI QIDQ1408641FDOQ1408641
Authors: Thomas Kittsteiner 
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- Efficient Auctions
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
Cited In (22)
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: an experimental study
- Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
- Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
- A competitive partnership formation process
- The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions
- Contests with rank-order spillovers
- Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
- Dissolving a partnership securely
- Optimal Value Declaration in “Buy-Sell” Situations
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
- Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
- Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Partnership dissolution: information and efficiency
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers
- Partnerships of bidders with constant relative risk aversions
- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
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