Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
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Publication:2453426
DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0690-2zbMath1288.91116OpenAlexW3122910811MaRDI QIDQ2453426
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0690-2
Mathematical economics (91B99) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
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- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
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- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
- A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
- Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
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