Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_5MaRDI QIDQ2670908zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, E. Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin

Publication date 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.09247

zbMATH Keywords

clock auctionsinterdependent valuesobvious ex-post equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Abstract: We study the problem of selling a good to a group of bidders with interdependent values in a prior-free setting. Each bidder has a signal that can take one of $k$ different values, and her value for the good is a weakly increasing function of all the bidders' signals. The bidders are partitioned into $ell$ expertise-groups, based on how their signal can impact the values for the good, and we prove upper and lower bounds regarding the approximability of social welfare and revenue for a variety of settings, parameterized by $k$ and $ell$. Our lower bounds apply to all ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms and our upper bounds are all within a small constant of the lower bounds. Our main results take the appealing form of ascending clock auctions and provide strong incentives by admitting the desired outcomes as obvious ex-post equilibria.

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Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
• Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
• Communications to the editor: Competitive bidding with disparate information
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(5)

• Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
• Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
• Nearest Neighbor Classification and Search
• Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
• Fair division with interdependent values

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