Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
From MaRDI portal
Abstract: Submodular over signal (SOS) defines a family of interesting functions for which there exist truthful mechanisms with constant approximation to the social welfare for agents with interdependent valuations. The best-known truthful auction is of -approximation and a lower bound of 2 was proved. We propose a new and simple truthful mechanism to achieve an approximation ratio of 3.315.
Recommendations
- Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
- Combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations: SOS to the rescue
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Implementation with interdependent valuations
- Incentives in Teams
- Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
- Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6167251)