Fair division with interdependent values

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9_5MaRDI QIDQ7034820zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Georgios Birmpas, Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Matteo Russo

Publication date 31 January 2025

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9_5

zbMATH Keywords

fair divisioninterdependent valuesmechanisms without money

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
• Almost envy-freeness with general valuations
• Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
• Communications to the editor: Competitive bidding with disparate information
• Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods and generic budgets
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents
• Fair division with binary valuations: one rule to rule them all
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3136641 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• Interdependent public projects
• On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
• On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations
• Private interdependent valuations
• Simultaneously achieving ex-ante and ex-post fairness
• Sur la division pragmatique
• Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: monotonicity and strategyproofness

Cited in

(1)

• Fair division with interdependent values

This page was built for publication: Fair division with interdependent values

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7034820)