Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
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Linear programming (90C05) Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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(79)- Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes
- Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types
- Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming
- Robust bilateral trade with discrete types
- Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information
- Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
- A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Simple majority rule and integer programming
- Pricing lotteries
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- Kalai and Muller's possibility theorem: a simplified integer programming version
- Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Non-linear pricing by convex duality
- Modularity and greed in double auctions
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
- Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
- The combinatorial world (of auctions) according to GARP
- Welfare and revenue guarantees for competitive bundling equilibrium
- Mechanisms with monitoring for truthful RAM allocation
- A unifying impossibility theorem
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products
- Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values
- Game efficiency through linear programming duality
- Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
- Game theory and mechanism design
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Combinatorial auctions without money
- Testing the quantal response hypothesis
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- Robust screening under ambiguity
- Mechanisms for linear programs
- Communication in Mechanism Design
- The design of a dynamic allocation mechanism for the federal energy assistance program LIHEAP
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
- Ordinal allocation
- Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- Multidimensional screening after 37 years
- The axiomatics of economic design, Vol. 1. An introduction to theory and methods
- Data-driven contract design
- Target-oriented regret minimization for satisficing monopolists
- Optimal job assignment with spillover effects
- Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately
- Nonnegative cross-curvature in infinite dimensions: synthetic definition and spaces of measures
- Quota implementation in assignment games
- On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Discrete single-parameter optimal auction design
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization
- Characterizing implementability via weak monotonicity on unit demand valuation domains
- Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: structural properties and the serial Vickrey mechanism
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- Decomposing random mechanisms
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