Quota implementation in assignment games

DOI10.1007/S00355-025-01589-8MaRDI QIDQ6893295zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Xu Lang, Jiahui Li

Publication date 26 November 2025

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-025-01589-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

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• Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
• Stable matching with proportionality constraints
• Submodular functions and optimization.
• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• The assignment game. I: The core

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