Symmetric reduced-form voting
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Cites work
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
- Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
- Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
- Equitable Voting Rules
- Extreme points and majorization: economic applications
- Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
- Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
- Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
- On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- Reduced form auctions revisited
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- The veil of public ignorance
- Voting by Committees
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