Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
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Cited in
(32)- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information
- Intertemporal allocation with unknown discounting
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- An Extension to the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- Efficient compromising
- Decomposing probability marginals beyond affine requirements
- Alea iacta est: auctions, persuasion, interim rules, and dice
- Selling to multiple no-regret buyers
- Random allocations of multiple objects with incomplete information
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Welfare-preserving \(\varepsilon \)-BIC to BIC transformation with negligible revenue loss
- Asymmetric reduced form auctions
- Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
- Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
- A demand partitioning framework to reserve production for small enterprises
- Reduced form auctions revisited
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality
- An algorithmic framework for black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to algorithm design
- Quota implementation in assignment games
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
- Who wants to be an auctioneer?
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
- Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
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