Who wants to be an auctioneer?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105820zbMATH Open1539.91062MaRDI QIDQ6537237FDOQ6537237

Authors: Sergei Severinov, Gábor Virág 

Publication date: 14 May 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

directed searchcompeting mechanismsendogenous postingtrading platforms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Definable and contractible contracts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• High profit equilibria in directed search models
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Indeterminacy and directed search.
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
• Internet auctions with many traders
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Markets versus negotiations: the predominance of centralized markets
• An ascending double auction
• Should buyers or sellers organize trade in a frictional market?

Cited In (3)

• MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
• All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers
• Simultaneous bidding in competing auctions

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