Who wants to be an auctioneer?
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Publication:6537237
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3586221 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
- An ascending double auction
- Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
- Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Definable and contractible contracts
- High profit equilibria in directed search models
- Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
- Indeterminacy and directed search.
- Internet auctions with many traders
- Markets versus negotiations: the predominance of centralized markets
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Should buyers or sellers organize trade in a frictional market?
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
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