Who wants to be an auctioneer?

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105820MaRDI QIDQ6537237zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sergei Severinov, Gábor Virág

Publication date 14 May 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

directed searchcompeting mechanismsendogenous postingtrading platforms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Seller competition by mechanism design
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
• Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3586221 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• An ascending double auction
• Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Definable and contractible contracts
• High profit equilibria in directed search models
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Indeterminacy and directed search.
• Internet auctions with many traders
• Markets versus negotiations: the predominance of centralized markets
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Should buyers or sellers organize trade in a frictional market?
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large

Cited in

(3)

• MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
• Simultaneous bidding in competing auctions
• All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers

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