Optimization and mechanism design

DOI10.1007/s10107-012-0559-2zbMath1254.91257OpenAlexW2043072159MaRDI QIDQ715235

Michael Martin Rakesh V. Vohra

Publication date: 2 November 2012

Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-012-0559-2

zbMATH Keywords

optimal allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonlinear programming (90C30) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (12)

Robust pooling for contracting models with asymmetric information ⋮ Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes ⋮ Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types ⋮ Non-linear pricing by convex duality ⋮ On envy-free perfect matching ⋮ Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem with Two-Dimensional Types ⋮ Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming ⋮ Robust bilateral trade with discrete types ⋮ Robust screening under ambiguity ⋮ On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret

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• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• Polymatroidal flow network models with multiple sinks
• Optimal Auction Design
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach

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