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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3399886 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
- On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Reduced form auctions revisited
Cited in
(16)- Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- An Extension to the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
- Alea iacta est: auctions, persuasion, interim rules, and dice
- Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
- Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
- Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders
- Reduced form auctions revisited
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
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