On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
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Recommendations
Cited in
(21)- Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- An Extension to the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
- Alea iacta est: auctions, persuasion, interim rules, and dice
- Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Asymmetric reduced form auctions
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- Contest design with threshold objectives
- Quota implementation in assignment games
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Random allocations of multiple objects with incomplete information
- An algorithmic framework for black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to algorithm design
- Reduced form auctions revisited
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
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