Contest design with threshold objectives

DOI10.1007/S00182-025-00964-0MaRDI QIDQ6876742zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg

Publication date 12 January 2026

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-025-00964-0

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontest theoryincomplete informationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Contest architecture
• Market Structure and Innovation
• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Award Scheme in Innovation Tournaments
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Revenue in contests with many participants
• The all-pay auction with complete information

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