Revenue in contests with many participants

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2013.12.008MaRDI QIDQ1667201zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arieh Gavious, Yizhaq Minchuk

Publication date 27 August 2018

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversioncontestall-pay auctionrevenue

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Crowdsourcing contests with entry cost
• Contests with endogenous entry
• Contests with an uncertain number of prizes with a fixed total value
• Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest
• Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence
• Large contests
• Regulation through a revenue contest
• All-Pay Contests
• Endogenous entry in contests
• Crowdsourcing contests

Cites work

• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Contest architecture
• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests

Cited in

(8)

• Reverse contests
• Crowdsourcing contests with entry cost
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Risk taking in selection contests
• Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs
• Contests with an uncertain number of prizes with a fixed total value
• Contests with insurance
• Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players

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