A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
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- A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
- Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
- Computing simple mechanisms: Lift-and-round over marginal reduced forms
- Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints
- Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
- Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
- Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations
- Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
Cites work
- A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
- A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
- A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
- An \(n\)-to-\(1\) bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications
- An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
- Bayesian truthful mechanisms for job scheduling from bi-criterion approximation algorithms
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Haggling over substitutes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- Matroid prophet inequalities
- Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
- Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
- Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
- On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
- On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Optimal mechanism for selling two goods
- Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
- Pricing randomized allocations
- Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations
- Revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items
- Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
- Simple and nearly optimal multi-item auctions
- Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
- Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
- The complexity of optimal mechanism design
- The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- The value of information concealment
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Cited in
(13)- Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
- A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
- Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue
- Striking the balance: optimizing pricing schemes for time-sensitive buyers
- On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms
- Discrete single-parameter optimal auction design
- An algorithmic framework for black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to algorithm design
- Membership mechanism
- Nonbossy mechanisms: mechanism design robust to secondary goals
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