Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms

DOI10.1007/BF01212474zbMath0808.90150OpenAlexW2096673422MaRDI QIDQ1338098

Frank H. jun. Page

Publication date: 27 November 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212474

zbMATH Keywords

optimal mechanism designBayesian incentive compatible mechanismsincomplete information Stackelberg gamesseveral followers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions ⋮ Existence of optimal auctions in general environments ⋮ Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods

Cites Work

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