Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01358801zbMATH Open0683.90106OpenAlexW2100830912MaRDI QIDQ1825152FDOQ1825152

Frank H. jun. Page

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01358801

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zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg gamesincomplete informationincentive compatible strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Cites Work

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Cited In (9)

• Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information
• Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the continuity of expected utility
• Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Asymmetric probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg players
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Credibility in Stackelberg games
• Game theory for managing evolving systems: challenges and opportunities of including vector-valued strategies and life-history traits

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