Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/BF01358801MaRDI QIDQ1825152zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Frank H. jun. Page

Publication date 1989

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01358801

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg gamesincomplete informationincentive compatible strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(12)

• Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader
• Buying optimal payoffs in bi-matrix games
• Asymmetric probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg players
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• Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1135752 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the continuity of expected utility
• Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
• Credibility in Stackelberg games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1004315 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games
• Game theory for managing evolving systems: challenges and opportunities of including vector-valued strategies and life-history traits

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