Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3894186 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(12)- Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information
- Buying optimal payoffs in bi-matrix games
- Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1004315 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the continuity of expected utility
- Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader
- Asymmetric probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg players
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1135752 (Why is no real title available?)
- Credibility in Stackelberg games
- Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games
- Game theory for managing evolving systems: challenges and opportunities of including vector-valued strategies and life-history traits
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