Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
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Publication:1825152
DOI10.1007/BF01358801zbMath0683.90106OpenAlexW2100830912MaRDI QIDQ1825152
Publication date: 1989
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01358801
Related Items (4)
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms ⋮ On the continuity of expected utility ⋮ Game theory for managing evolving systems: challenges and opportunities of including vector-valued strategies and life-history traits ⋮ Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
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