Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.11.008MaRDI QIDQ6665657zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Yu-Hao Li

Publication date 17 January 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strategic behaviorStackelberg equilibriumextensive-form gamesprivate information manipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005721 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dynamic incentive-aware learning: robust pricing in contextual auctions
• Game-theoretic patrolling with dynamic execution uncertainty and a case study on a real transit system
• Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to
• Multiagent Systems
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
• Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
• Tackling sequential attacks in security games
• The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
• The security of machine learning
• Watch and learn: optimizing from revealed preferences feedback

Cited in

(1)

• Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

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