Credibility in Stackelberg games
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Publication:800841
DOI10.1016/S0167-6911(84)80098-5zbMath0551.90101MaRDI QIDQ800841
Peter B. Luh, Yu-Chi Ho, Ying-Ping Zheng
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Systems \& Control Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
existence; credibility; incentives; principle of optimality; Stackelberg game; threats; two-person, single-stage games
91A05: 2-person games
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Cites Work
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