Recommendations
- Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1539042
- Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: an extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
- Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 57452
Cites work
- A Stackelberg solution of dynamic games
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game
- Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
- Derivation of necessary and sufficient conditions for single-stage Stackelberg games via the inducible region concept
- Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability
- Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
- On incentive problems
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Sequential Equilibria
- Solutions and properties of multi-stage Stackelberg games
Cited in
(5)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1539042 (Why is no real title available?)
- Reputazione e credibilità di una minaccia in un gioco di contrattazione
- Credibility of information in ``soft games with interperception of emotions.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2183048 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive control of humanistic systems
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