Credibility in Stackelberg games
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Publication:800841
DOI10.1016/S0167-6911(84)80098-5zbMATH Open0551.90101OpenAlexW2010059110MaRDI QIDQ800841FDOQ800841
Authors: Peter B. Luh, Yingping Zheng, Yu-Chi Ho 
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Systems \& Control Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6911(84)80098-5
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existenceprinciple of optimalityincentivesStackelberg gamecredibilitythreatstwo-person, single-stage games
Cites Work
- Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Sequential Equilibria
- Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
- Solutions and properties of multi-stage Stackelberg games
- On incentive problems
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
- A Stackelberg solution of dynamic games
- Derivation of necessary and sufficient conditions for single-stage Stackelberg games via the inducible region concept
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