Credibility in Stackelberg games

DOI10.1016/S0167-6911(84)80098-5zbMath0551.90101OpenAlexW2010059110MaRDI QIDQ800841

Peter B. Luh, Yu-Chi Ho, Ying-Ping Zheng

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Systems \& Control Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6911(84)80098-5

zbMATH Keywords

existencecredibilityincentivesprinciple of optimalityStackelberg gamethreatstwo-person, single-stage games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (1)

Incentive control of humanistic systems

Cites Work

• Solutions and properties of multi-stage Stackelberg games
• On incentive problems
• Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game
• A control-theoretic view on incentives
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Derivation of necessary and sufficient conditions for single-stage Stackelberg games via the inducible region concept
• Information structure, Stackelberg games, and incentive controllability
• Sequential Equilibria
• Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
• Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
• A Stackelberg solution of dynamic games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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