Reputazione e credibilità di una minaccia in un gioco di contrattazione

DOI10.1007/BF02093651MaRDI QIDQ4022679zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carlo Alberto Magni, Gianni Ricci

Publication date 17 January 1993

Published in Rivista di Matematica per le Scienze Economiche e Sociali (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02093651

zbMATH Keywords

cheatingthreatbargaining games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Reputation in dynamic games
• Credibility in Stackelberg games
• Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game
• Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining

Cited in

(2)

• Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining
• The credibility of a threat to nationalize

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