No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
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Publication:1753706
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.001zbMath1422.91303OpenAlexW2592815294MaRDI QIDQ1753706
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.001
Related Items (3)
Bargaining with evolving private information ⋮ Bargaining under almost complete information ⋮ No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
Cites Work
- The deadline effect
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
- Option values and bargaining delays
- The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
- No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
- A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
- The gambling effect of final-offer arbitration in bargaining
- Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
- Reputational Bargaining With Minimal Knowledge of Rationality
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Waiting to Persuade
- Bargaining and Reputation
- One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
- A theory of political gridlock
- Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
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