A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_12MaRDI QIDQ2959828zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin

Publication date 10 February 2017

Published in Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_12

zbMATH Keywords

additive biddersapproximately optimal auctionsmechanism designprior-independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Multiattribute auctions based on generalized additive independence
• Revenue-optimal deterministic auctions for multiple buyers with ordinal preferences over fixed-price items
• Revenue-maximizing auctions: a bidder's standpoint
• Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders
• Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
• Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels
• Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• Revenue maximizing envy-free fixed-price auctions with budgets
• Optimal quota allocation for a revenue-maximizing auction holder facing a random number of bidders

Cites work

• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
• Making the Most of Your Samples
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• On the computational complexity of optimal simple mechanisms
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• The sample complexity of auctions with side information
• The sample complexity of revenue maximization

Cited in

(13)

• Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
• Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Bayesian auctions with efficient queries
• Vickrey auctions for irregular distributions
• Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
• A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
• Nearest Neighbor Classification and Search
• Revenue-maximizing auctions: a bidder's standpoint
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
• Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders
• Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue
• On the optimal fixed-price mechanism in bilateral trade

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