On the optimal fixed-price mechanism in bilateral trade
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Publication:6499263
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6381703 (Why is no real title available?)
- (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
- Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
- Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade
- Learning algorithms for second-price auctions with reserve
- Pricing with samples
- Revenue maximization with a single sample
- Robust trading mechanisms
- Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization
- The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization
- The sample complexity of revenue maximization
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