Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders

DOI10.1145/2213977.2214018MaRDI QIDQ5415492zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tim Roughgarden, Stefano Leonardi

Publication date 13 May 2014

Published in Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/2213977.2214018

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic mechanism designauction theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(6)

• Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
• Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions
• Nearest Neighbor Classification and Search
• Cumulative offer process is order-independent

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