Bayesian Mechanism Design
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Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Optimal statistical designs (62K05) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to computer science (68-02) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cited in
(24)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments
- An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement
- Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
- On a modification of the VCG mechanism and its optimality
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
- Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011
- Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
- Near-optimal and robust mechanism design for covering problems with correlated players
- Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
- On the planner's loss due to lack of information in Bayesian mechanism design
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Making the Most of Your Samples
- Pricing with samples
- Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
- Mechanism design
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2226165 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning in repeated auctions
- On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
- On submodular prophet inequalities and correlation gap
- The k-facility location problem via optimal transport: a Bayesian study of the percentile mechanisms
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