Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Classes of orderings of measures and related correlation inequalities. I. Multivariate totally positive distributions
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Optimal Auction Design
- \(k\)-price auctions: revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design
Cited in
(9)- A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- A Bayesian approach to continuous type principal-agent problems
- Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
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