Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
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Publication:2482644
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.10.002zbMATH Open1133.91531OpenAlexW3121399372MaRDI QIDQ2482644FDOQ2482644
Authors: Thomas A. Weber, Abhishek Bapna 
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/187503/files/Weber-Bapna-JME.pdf
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Classes of orderings of measures and related correlation inequalities. I. Multivariate totally positive distributions
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Optimal Auction Design
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Implementation in differential information economies
- \(k\)-price auctions: revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design
Cited In (9)
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Bayesian Mechanism Design
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting
- A Bayesian approach to continuous type principal-agent problems
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