A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting

DOI10.1016/J.COR.2016.05.009MaRDI QIDQ342509zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lê Nguyên Hoang, François Soumis, Georges Zaccour

Publication date 17 November 2016

Published in Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2016.05.009

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessincentive compatibilitycake-cutting problemreturn function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
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• Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences
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• A Bayesian optimization approach to find Nash equilibria
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1234106 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1015852 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
• Bayesian incentive compatibility via fractional assignments
• Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Auction Design
• Truth, justice, and cake cutting
• Truthful Fair Division

Cited in

(1)

• Incentive compatible, collaborative production scheduling with simple communication among distributed agents

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