Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109064MaRDI QIDQ2180735zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 14 May 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.03174

zbMATH Keywords

cake-cuttingfair divisionsingle-peaked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Abstract: We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang-Wu, and which achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.

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Cites work

• An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
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Cited in

(10)

• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
• Cake cutting with single-peaked valuations
• Fair cake-cutting in practice
• A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting
• Rationing rules under uncertain claims: a survey
• Fair Cake Division Under Monotone Likelihood Ratios
• Maximize egalitarian welfare for cake cutting
• Connected equitable cake division via Sperner's lemma

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