Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109064zbMath1434.91034arXiv2002.03174OpenAlexW3010403850MaRDI QIDQ2180735

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 14 May 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.03174

zbMATH Keywords

fair divisionsingle-peaked preferencescake-cutting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Fair cake-cutting in practice ⋮ Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting ⋮ Rationing Rules Under Uncertain Claims: A Survey

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