Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:2453443
DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2zbMath1288.91126OpenAlexW2088605609MaRDI QIDQ2453443
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0674-2
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