Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:2453443
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Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
Cited in
(25)- Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
- Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
- Random assignments of bundles
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
- Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem
- The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
- Assigning agents to a line
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- On slots' scheduling
- A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence
- Impossibility results in the probabilistic assignment problem with stochastic same-sidedness and minimal invariance
- Neighborhood top trading cycles
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