A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
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Cited in
(60)- On slots' scheduling
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
- Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
- Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
- Random aggregation without the Pareto principle
- Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem
- Game-theoretically secure protocols for the ordinal random assignment problem
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result
- A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Arrays of distinct representatives --- a very simple NP-complete problem
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- Random scheduling with deadlines under dichotomous preferences
- Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights
- The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- Assigning agents to a line
- A two-objective fuzzy \(k\)-cardinality assignment problem
- Random assignments and outside options
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems
- A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence
- Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences
- On popular random assignments
- Impossibility results in the probabilistic assignment problem with stochastic same-sidedness and minimal invariance
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
- The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
- Egalitarian random assignment
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
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