A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
From MaRDI portal
Publication:699028
DOI10.1007/s001990100168zbMath1022.91018OpenAlexW1990547061MaRDI QIDQ699028
Hervé Moulin, Anna Bogomolnaia
Publication date: 21 October 2003
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100168
Related Items (43)
Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? ⋮ Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain ⋮ An alternative characterization of top trading cycles ⋮ Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object ⋮ Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types ⋮ Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems ⋮ Random scheduling with deadlines under dichotomous preferences ⋮ Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ Random aggregation without the Pareto principle ⋮ A two-objective fuzzy \(k\)-cardinality assignment problem ⋮ The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods ⋮ Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments. ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Assigning agents to a line ⋮ Two simple variations of top trading cycles ⋮ When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? ⋮ Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem ⋮ Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem ⋮ Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences ⋮ Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model ⋮ The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments ⋮ A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences ⋮ A new solution to the random assignment problem. ⋮ Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants ⋮ Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money ⋮ Random assignment under weak preferences ⋮ Consistency in house allocation problems ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure ⋮ Size versus fairness in the assignment problem ⋮ Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems ⋮ Pairwise kidney exchange
This page was built for publication: A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
