Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model

DOI10.1007/S10058-022-00289-4MaRDI QIDQ6156325zbMATHFDO

Authors Sulagna Dasgupta, Debasis Mishra

Publication date 13 June 2023

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.13104

zbMATH Keywords

ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibilityprobabilistic serial mechanismrandom assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Abstract: We explore the consequences of weakening the notion of incentive compatibility from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) in the random assignment model. If the common prior of the agents is a uniform prior, then a large class of random mechanisms are OBIC with respect to this prior -- this includes the probabilistic serial mechanism. We then introduce a robust version of OBIC: a mechanism is locally robust OBIC if it is OBIC with respect all independent priors in some neighborhood of a given independent prior. We show that every locally robust OBIC mechanism satisfying a mild property called elementary monotonicity is strategy-proof. This leads to a strengthening of the impossibility result in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001): if there are at least four agents, there is no locally robust OBIC and ordinally efficient mechanism satisfying equal treatment of equals.

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Cited in

(3)

• The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
• Some further results on random OBIC rules

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