Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
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Publication:6156325
DOI10.1007/S10058-022-00289-4zbMATH Open1515.91106arXiv2009.13104MaRDI QIDQ6156325FDOQ6156325
Sulagna Dasgupta, Debasis Mishra
Publication date: 13 June 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We explore the consequences of weakening the notion of incentive compatibility from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) in the random assignment model. If the common prior of the agents is a uniform prior, then a large class of random mechanisms are OBIC with respect to this prior -- this includes the probabilistic serial mechanism. We then introduce a robust version of OBIC: a mechanism is locally robust OBIC if it is OBIC with respect all independent priors in some neighborhood of a given independent prior. We show that every locally robust OBIC mechanism satisfying a mild property called elementary monotonicity is strategy-proof. This leads to a strengthening of the impossibility result in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001): if there are at least four agents, there is no locally robust OBIC and ordinally efficient mechanism satisfying equal treatment of equals.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.13104
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