Recommendations
- Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
- Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
Cites work
- A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
- Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
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