A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

DOI10.3982/TE1972MaRDI QIDQ4586049zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1972

zbMATH Keywords

compromiserandom social choice functionssingle-peaked preferencesstrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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• Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
• Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains
• Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
• A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
• Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
• Single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternatives
• On the implementation of the median
• Asymmetric single-peaked preferences
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Single-peakedness and semantic dimensions of preferences
• Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
• SINGLE PEAKED FUZZY PREFERENCES IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODELS: DOES BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM HOLD?
• A characterization of the single-peaked domain
• Note on compromise axiom
• Some further results on random OBIC rules
• Meta-agreement and rational single-peaked preferences
• The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions
• Single-peaked choice

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