Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
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Publication:2294116
DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1135-7zbMath1432.91050OpenAlexW2809302998MaRDI QIDQ2294116
Publication date: 10 February 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1135-7
Related Items (3)
Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Manipulability in a group activity selection problem ⋮ Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities
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