Manipulability in a group activity selection problem
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Publication:2417416
DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1155-zzbMath1410.91199OpenAlexW3122716978MaRDI QIDQ2417416
Publication date: 12 June 2019
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1155-z
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Cites Work
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