Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion
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Publication:545162
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.03.004zbMATH Open1230.91015OpenAlexW2171692416MaRDI QIDQ545162FDOQ545162
Authors: Mehmet Karakaya 
Publication date: 22 June 2011
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/21939
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Cites Work
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- Individual and group stability in neutral restrictions of hedonic games
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- Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games
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- Profit sharing with thresholds and non-monotone player utilities
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- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
- On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games
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