Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0926-ZMaRDI QIDQ284366zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ivan Balbuzanov

Publication date 18 May 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11343/120621

zbMATH Keywords

convex strategyproofnessprobabilistic serial mechanismrandom serial dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
• On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism

Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems

Cited in

(14)

• Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
• Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
• Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
• Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry
• Constrained random matching
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
• Some further results on random OBIC rules
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
• Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain

This page was built for publication: Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q284366)