Constrained random matching
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4089320 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1538127 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A pivoting algorithm for convex hulls and vertex enumeration of arrangements and polyhedra
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- A theory of school-choice lotteries
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Approximate random allocation mechanisms
- Assignment problems with complementarities
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- House allocation with fractional endowments
- How good are convex hull algorithms?
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0,1-vertices
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
- The maximum numbers of faces of a convex polytope
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- The quickhull algorithm for convex hulls
- Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Cited in
(18)- A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
- Efficient matching under general constraints
- Fair matching under constraints: theory and applications
- Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism
- A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
- Matching with Regular Constraints
- Simultaneous eating algorithm and greedy algorithm in assignment problems
- Employment by lotto revisited
- Approximate efficiency in matching markets
- Matching with floor constraints
- Matching through institutions
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
- Ex ante and ex post envy-freeness on polytope resources
- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
- Stable matching with proportionality constraints
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