Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0698-7MaRDI QIDQ2453416zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Nicolò, Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0698-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• On cores and indivisibility
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(11)

• Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
• Constrained random matching
• Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
• An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments
• Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
• Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2099767 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
• Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
• The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible

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