Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
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Publication:2265934
DOI10.1007/BF00452885zbMath0559.90003OpenAlexW2048453067MaRDI QIDQ2265934
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00452885
efficiencyanonymityIndependence of Irrelevant Alternativescoalitionally strategy proof choiceCW mechanismgeneralized Condorcet Winner
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