scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3051457
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5789649
Cited in
(21)- Condorcet's paradox
- Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
- On the derivation of majority rule
- Multi-person decision analysis in large scale systems group decision making
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Nondictatorial social welfare functions with different discrimination structures
- Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- A brief history of social choice and welfare theory
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
- Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect
- Downsian competition when no policy is unbeatable
- Voting
- Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure
- Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
- Randomized strategyproof mechanisms for multi-stage facility location problem with capacity constraints
- Neighborhood top trading cycles
- Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
- Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case
- Search by committee
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5789649)
