Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
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Publication:1137935
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90062-9zbMath0429.90006OpenAlexW2087354261MaRDI QIDQ1137935
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90062-9
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