Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
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Publication:2787396
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_4zbMath1331.91066OpenAlexW177300510MaRDI QIDQ2787396
Publication date: 25 February 2016
Published in: Theory and Decision Library C (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6_4
Related Items (4)
Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule ⋮ Nash implementable domains for the Borda count ⋮ Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules ⋮ A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions
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- Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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