A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108567MaRDI QIDQ2324698zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Madhuparna Karmokar, Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken

Publication date 12 September 2019

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108567

zbMATH Keywords

dictatorshipgroup strategy-proofnessinseparable top-pairPareto optimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• Circular domains
• Dictatorial domains
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains

Cited in

(5)

• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
• Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation

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