Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
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Publication:2093824
DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01399-2zbMath1501.91062OpenAlexW4226471951MaRDI QIDQ2093824
Publication date: 27 October 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01399-2
Cites Work
- Circular domains
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Dictatorial domains
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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