Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem
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Publication:1176220
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(91)90032-OzbMath0751.90008OpenAlexW2076616008MaRDI QIDQ1176220
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(91)90032-o
domain restrictionArrow's theoremdiscrete aggregationGibbard- Satterthwaite theoremsmooth aggregation
Related Items (3)
The aggregated excess demand function and other aggregation procedures ⋮ Complexity and the geometry of voting ⋮ Arrow's theorem and theory choice
Cites Work
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- Handbook of mathematical economics. Volume III
- Arrow's theorem with a fixed feasible alternative
- Symmetry, voting, and social choice
- Social choice in economic environments
- The amalgamation and geometry of two-by-two contingency tables
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
- The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
- Choice structures and preference relations
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
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