Arrow's theorem and theory choice
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Publication:484976
DOI10.1007/S11229-013-0372-3zbMATH Open1318.03024OpenAlexW2009375648MaRDI QIDQ484976FDOQ484976
Authors: Davide Rizza
Publication date: 8 January 2015
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0372-3
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
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- Geometry of voting
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- Basic Geometry of Voting
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
- A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
- Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem
- Social welfare orderings for ratio-scale measurable utilities
- Connecting and resolving Sen's and Arrow's theorems
- An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence
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