Social welfare orderings for ratio-scale measurable utilities

DOI10.1007/S001990050156zbMATH Open0882.90004OpenAlexW1971147493MaRDI QIDQ1365366FDOQ1365366

Authors John A. Weymark, Kai Yuen Tsui 

Publication date 28 August 1997

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050156

zbMATH Keywords

impossibility theoremCobb-Douglascontinuous social welfare orderings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• Multidimensional welfare rankings under weight imprecision: a social choice perspective
• Social welfare functions with a reference income
• Measurement scales and welfarist social choice
• Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice
• Strong dictatorship via ratio-scale measurable utilities: a simpler proof
• Arrow's theorem and theory choice
• Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction
• The orness value for rank-dependent welfare functions and rank-dependent poverty measures
• Extensive measurement in social choice
• Interpersonal comparison necessary for Arrovian aggregation
• Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: rationalizability and Nash solutions

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