Social welfare orderings for ratio-scale measurable utilities
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Publication:1365366
DOI10.1007/S001990050156zbMATH Open0882.90004OpenAlexW1971147493MaRDI QIDQ1365366FDOQ1365366
Kai Yuen Tsui, John A. Weymark
Publication date: 28 August 1997
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050156
Cited In (13)
- Random utility models and their applications: Recent developments
- Nash social welfare orderings.
- An axiomatization of the mixed utilitarian-maximin social welfare orderings
- Multidimensional welfare rankings under weight imprecision: a social choice perspective
- Social welfare functions with a reference income
- Existence of a Dictatorial Subgroup in Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales, an Alternative Proof
- Strong dictatorship via ratio-scale measurable utilities: a simpler proof
- Arrow's theorem and theory choice
- Roberts' weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction
- The orness value for rank-dependent welfare functions and rank-dependent poverty measures
- Extensive measurement in social choice
- Interpersonal comparison necessary for Arrovian aggregation
- Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: rationalizability and Nash solutions
Recommendations
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